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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Conference on Private International Law established
the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction in 1980 (Hague Convention) in response to the legal
issues surrounding international parental kidnapping.1 Ninety-six
countries, including the United States and Japan, have adopted the
Convention as of 2016.2 Before signing and ratifying the Convention
1. See United Nations Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. See generally COLIN P.A. JONES, TOWARDS AN
“ASIAN” CHILD ABDUCTION TREATY? SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SINGAPORE AND
JAPAN JOINING THE HAGUE CONVENTION (Asian L. Inst., Working Paper No. 31,
2013) (showing that 22,000 children in Japan have one non-Japanese parent);
Barbara Stark, Foreign Fathers, Japanese Mothers, and The Hague Abduction
Convention: Spirited Away, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L. 761, 764 (explaining that increased
marriages between Japanese nationals and Westerners contribute to the increasing
number of cases of international parental kidnapping).
2. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 25 October
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in 2014, Japan was known as a “black hole” for abducted children of
divorced parents because most kidnapped children taken to Japan
were never seen again.3 Even after ratifying the Hague Convention,
Japan continues to be non-compliant4 because its unique Family
Register Act,5 Civil and Criminal Codes with respect to family law,6
and its Hague Convention Implementation Act7 all effectively lack
joint custody, meaningful enforcement mechanisms, and adequate
remedies for abandoned parents.8
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, STATUS TABLE,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017).
3. E.g., Keelikolani Lee Ho, The Need for Concentrated Jurisdiction in
Handling Parental Child Abduction Cases in the United States, 14 SANTA CLARA
J. INT’L L. 596, 603 (2016) (citing Commander Paul Toland’s Statement before the
United States House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
(Dec. 2, 2009)) (using his personal experience to urge the Commission to take
action on international parental kidnapping); see also Robin S. Lee, Bringing Our
Kids Home: International Parental Child Abduction & Japan’s Refusal to Return
Our Children, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 109, 137 (2010) (lamenting about the
fact that victims of international parental kidnapping would not be reunited, if at
all, until after children become adults); Jason Nitz, Comment, “Splitting the Baby”
Internationally: Evaluating the “Least Restrictive” Conundrum when Protecting
Children from International Parental Abduction, 16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L.
REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 417, 418 (2014) (citing Christopher Savoie’s statement at
a capitol press conference introducing House Resolution 1326 and sharing his
personal experience to urge the House to condemn Japan for failing to sign on to
the Hague Convention).
4. See U.S. DEP’T ST., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS: ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 30 (2016) [hereinafter IPCA]
(naming Japan in the 2016 annual report to Congress as out of compliance with the
Hague Convention due to an inability to enforce return orders issued by the courts
in Japan); E-mail from Jeffery Morehouse, Executive Dir., Bring Abducted
Children Home, to author (Feb. 16, 2017) (on file with author) (discussing the
2016 IPCA Report).
5. Koseki [Family Register Act], Act no. 224 of 1947 (Japan).
6. MINPŌ [MINPŌ ] [CIVIL C.] art. 725-1044 (Japan); KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ ] [PENAL
C.] art. 224 (Japan).
7. The Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, [Implementation Act], Act No. 48 of 2013, art.
4(1), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan).
8. See IPCA, supra note 4, at 32 (proposing continued efforts to bring Japan
into compliance with its obligations to enforce return orders); Colin P.A. Jones,
Professor, Doshisha Law Sch., Presentation at American Bar Association
International Law Event: 1+1=1 Understanding Japanese Family Law 6 (2014)
[hereinafter Jones, 1+1=1], www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/
international_law//primer1.pptx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (exposing the

480

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

The American military presence in Japan creates unique custody
issues for Japanese-American military families.9 For example, the
seminal case of Toland v. Futagi held that US Naval Commander
Toland could not gain custody of his daughter after his ex-wife
kidnapped her from a U.S. military base in Japan.10 When his exwife later committed suicide, Toland attempted to gain custody from
the child’s Japanese grandmother. However, the Japanese court
declined to resolve the issue and the Maryland court similarly
declined jurisdiction.11 In Savoie v. Martin, U.S. citizen Savoie
could not retrieve his children from his ex-wife after she refused to
return them from a visit to Japan despite a Tennessee court granting
Savoie full custody.12 In both cases, the Japanese legal system failed
to provide a remedy to the American military member when the
kidnapping parent took physical control over the children despite the
standing custody arrangement.13
weaknesses of the Japanese legal framework regarding compliance with the Hague
Convention).
9. See Thomas D. Farrell & David L. Manz, Farrell & Associates & The
Manz Law Firm, Presentation at American Bar Association International Law
Event: US Military Families in the Asia-Pacific (2014), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/international_law/2014/06/internationalfa
milies/Military1.pptx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (educating lawyers on the family
law system in Japan as US military members will encounter it).
10. See Toland v. Futagi, 40 A.3d 1051, 1065-66 (Md. 2012) (declining to
exercise jurisdiction over an interstate child custody dispute when a Japanese court
also declined jurisdiction over the dispute since the child had been settled in
Japan).
11. Id. at 1051.
12. See Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining declaratory
and injunctive relief to the plaintiff parent when the defendant judge lifted the
injunction that was preventing the abducting parent from taking the children to
Japan). See generally Charlie Reed, Overseas Custody Rights: American Parents
Struggle to Reunite with Children in Japan, STARS AND STRIPES: PACIFIC EDITION
(Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.stripes.com/news/overseas-custody-rights-americanparents-struggle-to-reunite-with-children-in-japan-1.93766#.WLKkDBIrLeQ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2017) (reporting as one of the official news agencies of the
Department of Defense and explaining the custody issues military families face in
Japan).
13. See Savoie, 673 F.3d at 496 (recognizing the U.S. custody arrangement that
was in place prior to the abduction); Toland, 40 A.3d at 1051 (conceding that the
American father was the only living parent). The Japanese and American courts
adjudicated the Savoie and Toland cases prior to Japan’s ratification of the Hague
Convention in 2014. Both Savoie and Toland led the international campaign
pressuring Japan to ratify the Hague Convention. See Paul Toland, Statement
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Japan’s Family Registry Act, Civil and Criminal Codes with
respect to family law, and Implementation Act should be amended to
better protect Japanese-American children of American military
members and to comply with the Hague Convention, especially with
respect to the Article 13 “grave risk” and “consent” provisions.14 The
Japanese Family Register Act,15 Civil and Criminal Code regarding
family law,16 and Implementation Act17 fail to protect abandoned
parents and kidnapped children, especially as experienced by
American military members.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical and legal
background giving rise to this problem, the modern legal context in
which this problem exists, and the applicable international law
against which Japanese legal culture clashes.18 Part III of this
Comment analyzes how Japan’s Family Register Act, Civil and
Criminal Code in family law, and Implementation Act violate the
Hague Convention.19 Part IV of this Comment provides
recommendations to amend Japanese law and utilize international
pressure so that Japan fulfills its obligations under the Hague
Convention.20 Part V of this Comment briefly concludes that Japan
fails to comply with its obligations under the Hague Convention.21

II. BACKGROUND
A. JAPANESE FAMILY REGISTRY SYSTEM, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT, AND CONSTITUTION
The historical development of Japanese Law with respect to
before the United States House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.bachome.org/news/category/testifying
(urging the Commission to increase pressure on Japan to sign on to the Hague
Convention); Jeff Sagnip, Smith, Moran Offer Bipartisan Resolution on Abducted
U.S. Children in Japan, U.S. CONGRESSMAN CHRIS SMITH (May 5, 2010),
http://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=184357
(condemning Japan for failing to sign on to the Hague Convention).
14. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 101, art. 13.
15. Koseki [Family Register Act].
16. CIVIL C. art. 725-1044; PENAL C. art. 224.
17. Implementation Act, Act No. 48 of 2013, art. 4(1).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
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international parental abduction begins with the Family Registry
System.22 This section discusses the origin and modern implications
of the Family Registry System, U.S.-Japan Status of Forces
Agreement, and Japanese Constitution.
The Japanese government traditionally structured society by
giving the head of the household authority to represent every
individual member over several generations.23 This deeply held
tradition prioritizes the group over the individual and continues to
influence Japanese legal culture.24 Remnants of the traditional
system exist in the modern Family Registry System that lists
registration of families up to two generations.25 Thus, the importance
of the group rather than the individual remains the basis for Japanese
family law.26
The modern implications of the Family Registry System provide
the bedrock to Japanese family law. When a Japanese citizen
registers a significant life event, such as a birth, divorce, or adoption,
the registration itself legally recognizes the event.27 However, this
system also maintains some nationalistic aspects of the pre-war
22. Koseki [Family Register Act].
23. Jones, 1+1=1, supra note 8, at 5-6. See generally Hisaya Nonoyama, The
Family and Family Sociology in Japan, 31 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 27, 27-28 (2000)
(exploring the Japanese family as an institution from its inception during the Meiji
government to its evolution after World War II).
24. See Colin P. Jones, In the Best Interests of the Court: What American
Lawyers Need to Know about Child Custody and Visitation in Japan, 174 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 166, 202 (2007) [hereinafter Jones, In the Best Interests of the
Court] (stating that the recordings in the household registry are a core source of
identity to Japanese people and sets forth their relationships with parents, spouses,
and children); Jones, 1+1=1, supra note 8, at 8 (clarifying that the occupying
American force wanted an individual system while the occupied Japanese
government wanted the traditional household based system).
25. Jones, 1+1=1, supra note 8, at 8.
26. See Koseki [Family Register Act], art. 9 (stating that the person at the head
of the register remains so, even after his or her name is removed from the register);
Kristy Horvath & Margaret Ryznar, Protecting the Parent-Child Relationship, 47
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 303, 316-17 (2015) (describing the family registry
system as the “core source of identity for people in Japan” since it records “births,
marriages, and legal custody of children after divorce”).
27. Colin P. Jones, Japan’s Koseki System: Dull, Uncaring But Terribly
Efficient, JAPAN TIMES (June 22, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
community/2016/06/22/issues/japans-koseki-system-dull-uncaring-terriblyefficient/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
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family registry, which only recognized Japanese citizens.28 For
example, non-Japanese spouses still cannot establish their own
family name in the registry.29 Instead, non-Japanese spouse’s names
are noted in the margins of the registry beside their Japanese
spouse’s family name.30 Since Japan is a civil law system that does
not rely as heavily on the judiciary as common law systems do, the
family registry is the center of domestic relations in Japan before
disputes reach the courts.31
Japanese law prefers that divorcing parties privately agree on
visitation rights.32 This stems from a Japanese legal culture that
values routine and stability over having both parents in the life of the
child.33 In 2017, the Tokyo High Court ruled that a father’s visitation
of 100 days out of the year would burden the child34 and that simply
28. Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry System Looks
Ever More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10, 2016), http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/japans-discriminatory-koseki-registry-systemlooks-ever-outdated/#.WJicTLYrKT8 (stating that the pre-war Koseki did not
allow non-Japanese citizens to become part of the registry or forced them to
become Japanese to enter the Koseki).
29. Koseki [Family Register Act], art. 16(3) (asserting that when a Japanese
national and foreigner marry the new registry will be created for the Japanese
national). See generally CIVIL C. art. 739 (declaring that marriages do not take
effect until they are registered with the Family Registry).
30. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry System Looks Ever More
Outdated, supra note 28; see Koseki [Family Register Act], art. 16(3) (stating that
a registry entry is for Japanese nationals only).
31. See CIVIL C. arts. 739, 791 (mandating most family law matters be
registered in the Koseki before they take effect); Linda D. Elrod, Japan Joins
Hague Abduction Convention: England Returns Child, 48 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352
(2014) (giving context as to why Japan’s unique family law structure delayed
Japan’s adoption of the Hague Convention); Toshiaki Iimura et al., Commentary,
The Binding Nature of Court Decisions in Japan’s Civil Law System, CHINA
GUIDING CASES PROJECT (2015) (describing the role of case law in the Japanese
civil law system).
32. Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 26, at 317 (explaining that divorcing parents
may agree to a visitation arrangement but clarifying that such a possibility only
came about in 2011 through amendment of the Japanese Civil Code).
33. See Kyodo News, ‘Good Parent’ Ditched in Custody Case Reversal, JAPAN
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2017),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/27/
national/crime-legal/reversal-high-court-ditches-good-parent-rule-granted-dadcustody-daughter/#.WJfrRrYrKT- (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (reporting on a case
that awarded a mother custody because she took the daughter away first and
planned to allow the father to visit only once a month).
34. Id.
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seeing the parent is not necessarily healthier for the child’s
development.35 This case demonstrates how Japanese courts reflect
the broader culture which values privacy and peaceful resolutions of
domestic relations over litigation.36
The U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)37 is another
important aspect of Japanese law. Under the SOFA, American
service members have certain rights within Japanese and U.S.
military relations.38 Service members may engage with the Japanese
family law system as well as the American family law system. This
is an important choice for American service members starting
families with Japanese nationals.39
Japan’s Constitution appears to provide a compatible legal culture
for courts to comply with international law.40 The Constitution
affords protections to individuals within domestic relations. For
example, the preamble provides for all people’s equal treatment
35. Id.
36. See generally ROBERT M. MURCH, THE JAPANESE NEGOTIATOR: SUBTLETY
AND STRATEGY BEYOND WESTERN LOGIC (1988) (studying Japan’s culture of
peaceful resolutions as demonstrated through its successful business culture).
37. Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan-U.S., June 23,
1960, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereinafter SOFA].
38. When service members arrive for duty in Japan, they receive training on
these rights. Joshua M. Austin, Untangling Myths on Options for Divorce in
Japan,
18th
WING
JUDGE
ADVOCATE
(Mar.
26,
2015),
http://www.kadena.af.mil/News/Features/Display/Article/770996/untanglingmyths-on-options-for-divorce-in-japan; Family Law, MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP
SMEDLEY D. BUTLER, http://www.mcbbutler.marines.mil/Base-Information/LegalAssistance/Family-Law/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (explaining that U.S. courts will
not always recognize divorces on Japanese soil); Mark E. Sullivan, Overseas
Divorce Issues – Far East, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL (Jan.
24, 2008), http://www.nclamp.gov/publications/the-legal-eagle/overseas-divorceissues-far-east/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (detailing the issues involved in getting
custody of children of divorce in Japan before the country signed the Hague
Convention).
39. See Austin, supra note 38 (explaining the differences in how support and
custody decisions are made in Japan and the United States); cf. Chiyomi Sumida,
Child Abduction Treaty to Take Effect in Japan, STARS AND STRIPES (March 31,
2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/child-abduction-treaty-to-take-effect-in-japan1.275440 (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (highlighting the amount of children taken to
Japan and not returned to parents before the Hague Convention was signed).
40. See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], preamble, paras. 2-3
(Japan).
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under the law41 and purports to abolish discrimination in Article
14(1).42 Indeed, Japan’s Constitution establishes the equal rights of
husband and wife in marriage43 and the rights of the individual in
divorce.44

B. JAPANESE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CODES
Japanese family law is founded in part on the Civil Code45 and
Criminal Code.46 This section discusses the Civil Code’s provisions
on marriage,47 divorce,48 and custody,49 as well as the Criminal
Code’s provision on kidnapping.50
i. Marriage
Japanese Civil Code Article 818(3) states that “parental authority
shall be exercised jointly by married parents.”51 This joint custody is
only available to married parents since divorce proceedings only
provide for one parent to maintain parental authority.52 Japanese
Civil Code Article 766(3) states that “[f]amily court may change the
agreement or determination under the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs and order any other proper disposition regarding
41. Id. (“We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in
peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself
alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such
laws is incumbent upon all nations.”).
42. Id. art. 14(1), paras. 2-3 (“All of the people are equal under the law and
there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”).
43. Id. art. 24, para. 1 (“Marriage shall be based sole on the mutual consent of
both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal
rights of husband and wife as a basis.”).
44. Id. art. 24, para. 2 (“With regard to choice of spouse, property rights,
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce, and other matters pertaining to marriage
and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and
the essential equality of the sexes.”).
45. CIVIL C. Part IV & Part V (Family Law).
46. PENAL C. art. 224.
47. CIVIL C. art. 818(3).
48. Id. art. 766(3).
49. Id. arts. 820-24.
50. PENAL C. art. 224.
51. CIVIL C. art. 818(3).
52. See id. art. 819 (recognizing that the court will determine “which parent”
will retain parental authority).
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custody over the child, if it finds this necessary.”53 There are three
types of divorce that are generally attempted in the following order
as prescribed by the courts: (1) mutual agreement in a ward office;
(2) conciliation proceeding by a family court; and (3) decision by a
family court or, if that fails, a judgment by a district court.54
ii. Ward Office Divorce
Potential problems arise when the Japanese spouse affects a ward
office divorce without the American spouse’s informed consent. For
example, a Japanese spouse may fraudulently elicit the American
spouse’s signature if he or she cannot understand Japanese.55 In
order to protect American military families who encounter the
Japanese family law system, American military families receive
training on their divorce options in Japan.56 The ward office divorce
is available for American couples without children, or a JapaneseAmerican couple, but only so long as all issues are agreed upon.57
Since it is not available for two Americans with children, American
military members encounter the ward office divorce uniquely in
mixed Japanese-American military families.58
iii. Divorce through Conciliation
When a mutual agreement at the ward office fails, the next
available type of divorce is conciliation by a family court.59 This
option is more impactful than arbitration or mediation because the
resulting settlement is as final as a legally binding judgment.60 The
conciliation process serves as the necessary first step for domestic
53. Id. art. 766(3).
54. Austin, supra note 38.
55. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 1, at 780-81 (using Savoie v. Martin as an
example to show that this ward office divorce fraud may be less common for
international spouses who speak and read Japanese).
56. See Austin, supra note 38 (noting that Japanese divorce law greatly differs
from American divorce law and is complicated by factors including whether the
married couple has children, which nationality each spouse holds, and whether the
couple is able to mutually agree to the terms of the divorce).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, GUIDE TO THE FAMILY COURT OF JAPAN 11
(2015).

2017]

JAPAN'S FAILURE TO PROTECT

487

disputes because Japanese norms require privacy in domestic
relations.61 Japan’s highest court, the Supreme Court, published a
guidance on family courts explaining that some individuals who
serve as judges are actually lawyers who work part-time in domestic
relations conciliation cases.62 This reveals the quasi-judicial nature
of conciliation proceedings.
iv. Divorce Through Family Court and District Court
When conciliation fails, the next step is a family court decision.63
Only when a family court order fails will the district court issue a
judgment.64 Family court decisions are not enforceable apart from a
levy of monetary fines.65
There are no ‘party name v. party name’ titles for ongoing family
law cases as in the U.S. system because most family law disputes go
through the conciliation system first, which aims to be nonadversarial.66 Further, Japanese family law cases that reach the
adversarial judicial system are private with only a select few
published.67 Thus, ongoing family law cases are sourced through
61. See Yoko Konno, Comment, A Haven for International Child Abduction:
Will The Hague Convention Shape Japanese Family Law?, 46 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
39, 51 (2015) (citing Roger Pulvers, Colorful Proverbs Capture a Peculiar
Sensibility, JAPAN TIMES (June 26, 2006) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
life/2006/06/27/language/colorful-proverbs-capture-a-peculiar-sensibility/#.
WLNmWBIrLeR) (“A well-known Japanese proverb illustrates this cultural norm:
‘[N]ot even a dog wants to bother with domestic disputes because they are tedious
and shameful.’”).
62. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 8-13 (publishing a
guidance on family courts and emphasizing family court judges’ legal expertise
without mentioning whether judges in family court have any specific expertise in
family law).
63. Austin, supra note 38.
64. Id.
65. Telephone Interview with Paul Toland, USN, Co-Founder & National
Director, Bring Abducted Children Home (Feb. 10, 2017).
66. See E-mail from Colin P.A. Jones, Professor, Doshisha Law Sch., to author
(Feb. 24, 2017) (on file with author) (“Family court judgments are not public so
you are reliant on whatever cases either the court or a lawyer decides to publish—
often in abbreviated annotated format. Japan is not a case law system . . .
particularly in the area of family law and many court decrees are essentially
administrative dispositions made by the court in lieu of clear governing law.”).
67. Since most of Japanese family law takes place through the conciliation
system and almost all family law cases are private, ongoing family law cases are
sourced through news reports. See id.
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news reports without party names.
An ongoing Tokyo case68 demonstrates that such monetary fines
do not result in the return of the child when the kidnapping parent
simply continues paying the fine.69 The Tokyo High Court accepted
the Tokyo Family Court’s reasoning that the father would not
comply with a December 2015 order to allow the mother to visit the
child monthly.70 Thus, when the father refused to comply with the
visitation orders, the mother asked the Family Court to order
“indirect compulsory execution” to compel the father’s compliance,
the Family Court granted the order and issued a fine of one million
yen.71
This fine of one million yen may signal a change in the Japanese
court system’s view of divorce, custody, parental kidnapping, and
families in general. Though indirect compulsory execution orders
are common, they usually amount to 50,000 yen or 100,000 yen per
refusal.72 Further, parents commonly pay the fines to continue
preventing visitation.73 In this case, the Tokyo Family Court seemed
to place a higher value on visitation rights as indicated by the
unusually high and financially prohibitive fine. Since the father
plans to appeal the fine to the Tokyo High Court,74 a decision
upholding the fine may move Japanese legal culture one step closer
to recognizing the value of both parents’ presence in a child’s life.
v. Custody
The relationship between the parents affects the default custody
arrangement. For example, a mother has automatic parental
68. Husband Ordered to Pay Wife 1 Mil. Yen Each Time He Refuses Child
Visitation
Rights,
MAINICHI,
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170121/
p2a/00m/0na/018000c (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
69. See Husband Ordered to Pay Wife 1 Mil. Yen Each Time He Refuses Child
Visitation Rights, supra note 68 (explaining that only after the Tokyo Family Court
imposed a fee of one million yen for each refusal of visitation did the father of a 7year-old girl permit his estranged wife to see their daughter for the first time in five
years).
70. Id.
71. Id. (specifying that the amount of one million yen per refusal was based on
the father’s income and other factors).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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authority in custody determinations between unmarried parents
unless the parents have a different agreement or the court orders that
the father has parental authority.75 The court orders which parent has
parental authority, granting custody determinations between divorced
parents to only one of the parents.76
The term “parental authority” originates from the Japanese Civil
Code Authority Articles 820, 821, and 824. “Parental authority” is
defined as the “duty to care for and educate the child,”77 the “right to
determine the child’s residence,”78 and the “right to administer the
child’s property.”79 Since Japanese culture largely adheres to
traditional gender norms, mothers usually retain custody of children
while fathers often decide not to pursue custody of the children.80
Japan’s Civil Code allows for a unilateral divorce, outlined in
Article 770, in five scenarios: (1) infidelity, (2) malicious desertion,
(3) uncertainty whether or not the spouse is dead or alive for three
years or more, (4) serious mental disease without hope of recovery,
or (5) a “grave reason” which makes continuing the marriage
impossible.81 These provisions present an especially difficult legal
position for American service members who are unaware that their
spouses could unilaterally terminate the marriage and leave with the
children.
75. Austin, supra note 38 (“In Japan, the general practice is to award custody
to the mother unless there is an overriding reason to award custody to the father.”).
76. CIVIL C. art. 819, para. 2 (“In the case of judicial divorce, the court shall
determine which parent shall have parental authority.” (emphasis added)). Since
2011, an amendment has allowed amicable couples to determine custody and
visitation issues without entering the judicial system. Id. art. 819, para. 1 (“If
parents divorce by agreement, they may agree upon which parent shall have
parental authority in relation to a child.”); see also Horvath & Ryzner, supra note
32, at 315-19 (evaluating Japan’s legal framework with respect to joint custody and
visitation rights).
77. CIVIL C. art. 820.
78. Id. art. 821.
79. Id. art. 824.
80. See Stark, supra note 1, at 773 (explaining that the father often accepts
minimal visitation privileges in order to avoid potential unpleasant confrontations
and an additional burden on the child); Takao Tanase, Divorce and the Best
Interest of the Child: Disputes over Visitation and the Japanese Family Courts, 20
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 564, 571 (Matthew J. McCauley trans., 2011) (noting that
courts often restrict visitations in cases of deep animosity between the mother and
the father because of the damaging effect of the forced visitations on the child).
81. CIVIL C. art. 770.

490

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

Provisions of the Civil Code also highlight the ways in which
Japanese legal structures view the differing roles and rights of men
and women in the family. Japanese Civil Code Article 731 sets the
marriageable age at 18 for men and at 16 for women82 while Article
733 prevents divorced women from remarrying until 100 days after
the divorce.83 Only non-pregnant divorced women may marry
immediately after divorce.84
vi. Criminal Parental Abduction
The Criminal Code contains another important aspect of
international parental kidnapping.85 Japanese Penal Code Article 224
states the punishment for “abduction of a minor” as “a person who
kidnaps a minor by force or enticement shall be punished by
imprisonment with work for not less than 3 months but not more than
7 years.”86 This vague phrasing allows “parental abduction” to be
both a criminal and non-criminal act.87
A court may find a father criminally liable for an action, but not
find a mother equally liable for the same action.88 For example, the
Kobe District Court concluded that a child is not illegally restrained
under the Habeas Corpus Act89 when the child “is happy in the
82. Id. art. 731.
83. Id. art. 733 (recently amended to shorten the original six month waiting
period).
84. Contra id. art. 733 (stipulating the mandatory six months waiting period for
divorced women before remarriage); Global Legal Monitor, Japan: New
Instructions Allow Women to Remarry 100 Days after Divorce, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japannew-instructions-allow-women-to-remarry-100-days-after-divorce/ (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017).
85. PENAL C. art. 224, para. 1.
86. Id.
87. Colin P.A. Jones, Divorce and Child Custody Issues in the Japanese Legal
System, US EMBASSY JAPAN OFFICIAL MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2012),
https://amview.japan.usembassy.gov/en/divorce-law-in-japan/.
88. Compare Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1993, 1993 (O) 609, 47
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 10, http://www.courts.go.jp/
app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1429 (Japan) (finding no criminal activity since remaining
with the kidnapping mother was not detrimental to the children), with Saikō
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 6, 2005, 2004 (A) 2199, 47 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEISHŪ
[KEISHŪ] 1, 10 (Japan) (finding criminal activity when a father used force to
remove infant children from the mother).
89. JINSHIN HOGO HŌ [Habeas Corpus Act], Law No. 199 of 1948, art. 1
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current situation in which he or she is being reared” even if a mother
used violence to take an infant child from the father’s hands.90
By contrast, in Savoie, the Japanese courts ruled that a father who
took his children off the street was committing a crime.91 However,
a mother who takes her children on the train or a plane to live with
her parents or refuses to return to the United States from Japan is not
considered a criminal under Japanese law.92 This discrepancy seems
to stem from a cultural devotion to public order and a reluctance to
get involved in ‘civil disputes.’93

C. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND IMPLEMENTATION ACT
The key international treaty in international parental kidnapping is
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague
Convention) that aims “to secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State.”94
Under the Hague Convention, a claim may be brought to return a
child younger than sixteen years old who was wrongfully removed
from his or her place of “habitual[] residenc[e].”95
Japan
implemented the Hague Convention through The Act for
Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (Implementation Act).96 Article 21 of
(Japan) (restating the Constitutional rights of illegally detained persons in Japan to
recover their freedom in a “prompt and easy manner”).
90. 1993 (O) no. 609, 47 MINSHŪ 10 (reasoning that the abandoned father
failed to show that granting custody to the kidnapping mother was more
detrimental to the child and thereby failed to establish a habeas corpus request).
91. See Jones, Divorce and Child Custody Issues in the Japanese Legal System,
supra note 87.
92. Id.
93. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 11 (offering statistics that
show increased adjudication of domestic relations cases and encouraging efforts to
combat this trend by “strengthen[ing] the conciliation proceedings”); Jones,
Divorce and Child Custody Issues in the Japanese Legal System, supra note 87
(explaining that since Japanese culture values privacy of the home, Japanese courts
prefer to exhaust the non-judicial conciliation process in which parties arrive at
their own agreement in lieu of a court order).
94. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 98, art. 1.
95. Id. at 99, art. 4.
96. Implementation Act, art. 26 (“A person whose rights of custody with
respect to a child are breached due to removal to or retention in Japan may file a
petition against the person who takes care of the child with a Family Court to seek
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the Hague Convention protects the parent’s right of access to his or
her child.97 Articles 3 and 5 describe custody rights while Article 13
outlines the exceptions to a return order, which include consent,
acquiescence, grave risk of harm, and the child’s objection.98 Under
Article 13, a court may deny returning a child if he or she objects to
the return when he or she is of an age and maturity that allows the
court to consider his or her views.99
The role of international law in Japan is key to international
parental kidnapping law. The legal hierarchy in Japan is as follows,
from highest to lowest: Constitution, International Law, Statutes,
Regulations, Agencies, and Local Laws.100 Generally, Japan follows
international law at the discretion of the judiciary.101 As such,
Japanese courts follow international law to different degrees
depending on the particular treaty and whether the treaty has been
ratified by Japan.102
Judges play a major role in adopting
international law principles and conforming these principles into
norms within the Japanese legal culture.103 Although Japanese courts
have not always willingly applied international treaty obligations
similarly to domestic laws, Japanese courts have begun doing so
today, especially towards “children, women, . . . and foreigners.”104
By signing and ratifying the Hague Convention, Japan agreed to
cooperate with other signatories to “secure the voluntary return of the
child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues.”105 The
Implementation Act, however, provides an exception to issuing
return orders when certain circumstances exist.106 Under Article 28,
an order to return the child to the state of habitual residence pursuant to the
provisions of this Act.”).
97. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 102, art. 21.
98. Id. at 98-101, arts. 3, 5, 13.
99. Id. at 101, art. 13.
100. Cf. Timothy Webster, International Human Rights Law in Japan: The View
at Thirty, 23 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 242, 244 (2010) (debating the legal force of
international law in Japan).
101. Id. at 243.
102. See id. at 242.
103. Id. at 243 (“Explicitly or implicitly, the political branches have essentially
entrusted judges with importing international law into Japan.”).
104. Kanami Ishibashi, Implementation of International Law in Japanese
Courts, 3 KOREAN J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 139 (2015).
105. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 99, art. 7(c).
106. Implementation Act, art. 28 (prohibiting return orders in certain
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a Japanese court will not issue a return order if it finds: (1) the
abandoned parent consented to the removal; (2) returning the child
would present a “grave risk;” (3) the child objects to the return; or
(4) the return would contradict human rights principles.107 Thus, the
Implementation Act provides considerable discretion to judges who
fail to abide by the Hague Convention principles. Indeed, the Hague
Convention may not help many families seeking their JapaneseAmerican children since the treaty is not retroactive.108

III. ANALYSIS
A. THE FAMILY REGISTER ACT ARTICLE 76 AND APPLICATION OF
THE CONCILIATION SYSTEM VIOLATE THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ARTICLES 8, 11, AND 21
Japan fails to comply with the Hague Convention in part because
of its unique Family Registry System. This section discusses how
the Family Registry System fails to provide for joint custody upon
divorce, that it has a preference for custody determinations outside of
the judicial system, and that substantial advantage is given to
Japanese parents over non-Japanese parents in custody disputes, all
in violation of the Hague Convention.
The Family Registry System only allows joint custody for married
couples as a child may only be registered under one family name.109
Because this system is a remnant of the traditional societal

circumstances, such as “prior consent,” “grave risk,” “child’s objection,” and
violation of Japanese principles of human rights).
107. Id.
108. Sumida, supra note 39 (“The treaty will not be applied to the cases to
return children who have been already in Japan after being removed from their
original residence.”). See generally Parental Kidnapping Treaty in Effect for
Japan, BLACK TOKYO (April 1, 2014) http://www.blacktokyo.com/
2014/04/01/parental-kidnapping-treaty-in-effect-for-japan/comment-page1/#comment-4882 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017) (introducing the non-Japanese
community of Japan’s perspective on ways in which the Hague Convention might
be applied in Japan).
109. See Family Register Act art. 76 (“Persons who wish to divorce shall
submit . . . the name of the party who will have parental authority, and the name
child(ren) who will be subject to that party.” (emphasis added)); see also CIVIL C.
art. 818, para. 1, no. 1 (“Parental authority shall be exercised jointly by married
parents.” (emphasis added)).
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organization of Japan,110 it fails to consider contemporary family
constructions in which divorced couples continue to co-parent shared
children. The Family Registration law reflects Japanese tradition
which favors the family unit over the individual.111 The child’s
required appearance under one parent’s registry112 and singular
custody upon divorce113 makes joint custody inflexible and unusual.
Because of this lack of joint custody, Japanese courts allow one
parent to maintain all rights regarding the child to the exclusion of
the other parent. As a result, Japanese courts do not recognize the
abandoned parent’s rights to access his or her child, as provided for
under Article 21 of the Hague Convention.114
As such, Article 76 fails to provide legal rights to the parent who
loses parental authority in the Family Registry System.115 Thus, in
international parental kidnapping cases, Japan avoids the “wrongful
removal” element of Article 3 of the Hague Convention when the
kidnapping parent retains the child on his or her family registry.116
Because a wrongful removal is a “breach of rights of custody”117
while those rights were actually exercised “at the time of removal,”118
a Japanese parent with sole custody may withhold a child from the
non-custodial parent without entering the scope of the Hague
Convention.119
Preference for custody determinations outside of the judicial
110. See supra Part II.A.
111. See Family Register Act art. 9 (stating that the person at the head of the
register remains so even after his or her name is removed from the register).
112. This determination is akin to a legal custody determination. For example,
only the parent with parental authority may register the child for school. CIVIL C.
art. 820; Family Register Act arts. 76 to 77-2 (stating that divorcing parties must
enter the name of the parent who will have parental authority).
113. CIVIL C. art. 819 ; see also Stark, supra note 1, at 772 (discussing rare
instances in which divorced parents agree to some form of joint custody outside of
the legal determination of custody).
114. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 102, art. 21.
115. Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 26, at 318-19 (asserting that a loss of
parental authority upon divorce hinders further development of the parent-child
relationship).
116. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 98, art. 3.
117. Id. art. 3(b).
118. Id.
119. See id.; see also id. at 100, art. 8 (outlining the process to request a return
order that begins with a claim that “a child has been removed or retained in breach
of custody rights”).
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system fails to comply with the Hague Convention. Japanese judges
overwhelmingly rule to maintain the status quo of whichever parent
has physical control of the child, which rewards the parent who
abducts the child first.120 The conciliation system is the first step in
the family court process because Japanese culture seeks resolution of
domestic disputes by avoiding open litigation.121 The Supreme
Court’s guidance on family law describes immediate litigation of
domestic matters as “not desirable” and strongly prefers a system
that maintains domestic peace by resolving “matter[s] amicably and
voluntarily in mutual concession.”122
Because the Japanese legal system eschews litigation proceedings
in domestic relations cases, the Japanese court system does not hear
Hague Convention actions on international parental abduction.123 As
of 2015, the Japanese government had not returned any of the
approximately 400 American children abducted since 1994.124
Further, Japanese law enforcement does not enforce family law
orders because they are typically administrative dispositions that do
not provide the authority for Japanese law enforcement to execute
such orders.125 The combination of these gaps in judicial jurisdiction
and law enforcement allow Japan to violate Article 11 of the Hague
120. Telephone Interview with Paul Toland, supra note 65; see SUPREME COURT
supra note 60, at 11 (explaining the ‘conciliation-first principle’ as a
necessary part of family court since it promotes maintenance of domestic peace
among relatives). Contra E-mail from Andrew Ellis, Country Officer, U.S. State
Department, to author (Feb. 27, 2017) (on file with author) (emphasizing that
Japanese courts do issue return orders but lack the enforcement mechanism to
execute those orders).
121. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 11; Stark, supra note 1, at
771 n.78 (citing Noriko Mizuno, Sex Discrimination in Japanese Family Law, in
FAMILY LAW AND GENDER BIAS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 155, 158 (Barbara
Stark ed., 1992)) (explaining that the Japanese family law reflects a Japanese
culture that believes disputes should be “resolved through mutual consultation”).
122. SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 11.
123. The Goldman Act to Return Abducted American Children: Ensuring
Administrative Action: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs House of Representatives, 114th Cong. 44 (2015) [hereinafter Goldman
Act: Ensuring Administrative Action] (statement of Captain Paul Toland, USN, CoFounder & National Director, Bring Abducted Children Home).
124. Id. at 43 (statement of Captain Paul Toland, USN, Co-Founder & National
Director, Bring Abducted Children Home).
125. Telephone Interview with Paul Toland, supra note 65; see E-mail from
Colin P.A. Jones, supra note 120.
OF JAPAN,
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Convention that requires enforcement of return orders and Article 21
that protects a parent’s right to access his or her child.126
Japanese legal culture gives substantial advantage to a Japanese
parent in international parental kidnapping cases, especially as
experienced by American military members,127 thereby weakening
the non-Japanese parent’s rights under the Hague Convention to
receive a return order for the wrongfully abducted child.128 A
petitioner initiates a domestic relations case by filing the relevant
forms to the court with jurisdiction.129
Because American service members often live with their Japanese
spouses and children in Japan,130 a ward office divorce is one way the
Japanese parent could affect a divorce and a custody award to the
disadvantage of the non-Japanese parent. There is no equivalent in
American law for a ward office divorce because of America’s’
different legal traditions.131 The non-Japanese parent likely fails to
understand the Japanese custody process, making it possible for a
Japanese parent to rely on this unique procedural, rather than
judicial, system to keep full custody of the child without the nonJapanese parent’s knowledge.132 The non-Japanese parent often lacks
the knowledge, including language ability, to effectively navigate the
family registry system. Thus, by the time the non-Japanese parent
becomes an abandoned parent, he or she enters the Japanese judicial
126. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 100, 102, arts. 11, 21.
127. See, e.g., Savoie, 673 F.3d at 490 (mentioning the risk of losing children to
the Japanese legal system that the lower court recognized); Toland, 40 A.3d at
1066 (deferring to the Japanese courts to resolve the custody dispute first). See
generally Mallory Simon, Dad in Japan Custody Battle Thought Wife Would Take
Kids, CNN (Oct. 2, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/10/02/
japan.savoie.custody.battle/index.html?eref=ib_us
(describing
Christopher
Savoie’s arrest and imprisonment in Japan when he attempted and failed to bring
his children to the US Consulate to enforce his US custody order).
128. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 15 (outlining the way a
petitioner initiates a domestic relations case using forms only available in
Japanese).
129. Id.
130. Cf. Telephone Interview with Paul Toland, supra note 65 (suggesting the
Department of Defense does not yet have a tracking system with statistics on how
many Japanese-American military families are stationed in Japan that would
enable data collection on parental abductions).
131. Austin, supra note 38.
132. See Jones, Towards an “Asian” Child Abduction Treaty?, supra note 1, at
8-9.
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system and international judicial system at a substantial
disadvantage. As mentioned above, a lack of custody under the
Japanese Family Registry Act substantially limits the remedy an
abandoned parent may receive under the Hague Convention.133

B. CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 819, 820, 821, AND 824, AND
APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLE 224 VIOLATE THE
HAGUE CONVENTION ARTICLES 1, 2, 8, 13, AND 21
A culture clash exists between Japanese and Western ideas of
parenthood and family that perpetuates Japan’s noncompliance with
the Hague Convention.134 For example, some parts of the Japanese
Civil Code contradict the equal rights granted by the Japanese
Constitution. The marriageable age135 and remarriage restrictions136
in the Civil Code demonstrate different standards for men and for
women.137 These laws reflect the gender bias inherent to the
Japanese family law system’s many levels; these biases also
permeate the custody determinations that allow Japanese courts to
avoid compliance with the Hague Convention. This section
discusses how the Civil Code’s gender bias and lack of visitation
rights violate the Hague Convention.
i. Mother Preference
The Japanese family law system heavily favors granting custody
to mothers over fathers.138 This is because the Japanese family law
system is accustomed to mothers caring for children with little help
133. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 100, art. 8 (providing that a claim
for a return order begins with a removal in “breach of custody rights”).
134. This culture clash exists between the east and west generally as China faces
similar custody and enforcement issues. See Reuters, In China, Calls for End to
Aggressive Child Custody Tactics, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/12/29/asia-pacific/social-issues-asiapacific/china-calls-end-aggressive-child-custody-tactics/#.WOELtRIrLeQ
(revealing that Chinese courts tend to grant custody to the parent who physically
has the child and encourage parents to enforce court orders themselves).
135. CIVIL C. art. 731.
136. Id. art. 733 (recently amended to shorten the original six month waiting
period).
137. See supra notes 79-81.
138. See CIVIL C. art. 819, para. 4 (mandating that “[a] father shall only exercise
parental authority with regard to a child of his . . . if both parents agree that he shall
have parental authority” (emphasis added)).
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from the husband,139 who often declines to request custody upon
separation and divorce.140 Because of this clash of cultures, the
Japanese judiciary does not value the role of both parents in the life
of the child, especially for divorced fathers. Thus, the courts
continue violating Article 21 and contradicting the Hague
Convention’s aims when they interpret domestic laws in such a way
that denies return orders to abandoned parents’.141
ii. Visitation laws violate Hague Convention Article 21
The Japanese family law system’s concept of visitation rights
conflict with the principles of the Hague Convention.142 In an
ongoing Tokyo case, a Tokyo High Court returned a child to her
mother by disregarding the “good parent” rule, which grants custody
to a parent more likely to allow visitation, and applied a “continuity
principle” instead, reasoning that seeing the parent more often was
not necessarily healthy for the child’s development.143 The court’s
ruling effectively rewarded the parent who kidnapped the child
first144 and conflicts with Article 21 of the Hague Convention,145
139. See, e.g., Francesca Sforza, The Man that Fights Japanese Law to See his
Children Again: “My Wife Took them and the Judicial System Protects Her”, LA
STAMPA (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.kizuna-cpr.org/italian-case (last visited Feb.
26, 2017) (highlighting an ongoing case in which a Japanese grandmother uses the
reasoning that mothers can raise children without help from husbands as an
argument against her abandoned son-in-law).
140. Stark, supra note 1, at 772-73 (explaining the various processes for
determining custody of children in a divorce and asserting that, during a disputed
custody battle, “fathers usually acquiesce to minimal visitation because they are
worn down by the process”). See generally Tanase, supra note 80, at 564.
141. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 98, 102, arts. 1, 2, 21 (requiring
states to ensure the “rights of access” and cooperation in returning abducted
children to their parents).
142. See Tanase, supra note 80, at 573-75 (citing Rikon# %en)et)u K')(' $('tei
Jiken—S(inken no %en)et)u K')(' "o %e*utte &-nen Arasotta jirei, 259 KĒSU
KENKYŪ 95-146 (1999)) (describing a case in which the examiner denied visitation
rights to the noncustodial parent based on the “will of the child” and arguing that
Japanese courts often mistake the “will of the child” for the “will of the custodial
parent” to deny visitation).
143. Kyodo News, supra note 33 (criticizing the Tokyo High Court’s decision to
overturn a lower court’s ruling to award custody to father based on the “good
parent rule,” and subsequently grant custody to the mother who kidnapped the
child).
144. Id.
145. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 102, art. 21.
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which is based on the principle that a parent has a right to access his
or her child and that a child benefits from contact with both parents.
iii. Visitation laws violate Hague Convention Article 13
Japanese visitation laws do not comply with Article 13 of the
Hague Convention, which requires a child’s views should be taken
into account with respect to a return order.146 Japanese family law
tends to restrict visitation rights to visits with intense supervision for
short periods of time—-an unnatural family environment that fails to
elicit the child’s trust in the abandoned parent.147 Thus, a child may
understandably refuse to return to the abandoned parent because no
meaningful relationship can be maintained through these
manufactured visitations. The kidnapping parent also exerts
disproportionate influence over the child’s perspective, potentially
criticizing the abandoned parent without giving the abandoned parent
the opportunity to repair the damage to his or her reputation in the
eyes of the child.148
Japanese visitation laws skew the power of the child’s objection to
return by stunting the bond between the abandoned parent and the
child.149 By failing to provide a viable framework in which a child
may maintain relationships with both parents after divorce, Japan’s
Civil Code violates the Hague Convention principles that prioritize
the child’s interests.150 Although Article 13 allows a court to deny a
return order when a child objects to a return,151 Japan’s prohibitively
146. See id. at 101, art. 13.
147. Cf. Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 26, at 317-19 (asserting that, despite
changes to the Japanese Civil Code which allowed for some visitation rights to
non-custodial parents, rights to visitation are not necessarily guaranteed in Japan).
148. See Stark, supra note 1, at 774 (criticizing Japanese custody determinations
that ignore negative influences that custodial parents can have on the perceived
“will of the child”).
149. Id.
150. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 98 (Preamble) (proclaiming that
signatory states are “[f]irmly convinced that the interests of children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to their custody . . . “). See generally
Suvendrini Kakuchi, Foreign Spouses in Japan Seek Easier Child Custody Laws,
THE LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY D. MORLEY – INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW,
www.international-divorce.com/japan_custody.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2017)
(asserting that there is a higher risk of domestic abuse because spouses are afraid to
leave their abusers for fear of losing their children).
151. Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 101, art. 13 (conditioning that
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strict visitation proceedings distort the purpose of this exception by
removing the child’s ability to object to the return free from the
kidnapping parent’s influential bias.
Japan’s Criminal Code as applied to parental child abduction also
fails to comply with the Hague Convention. Japanese legal culture
fails to appreciate the notion that a parent can abduct his or her own
child.152 In the Italian father case, both police and social services in
Japan recognized that a mother kidnapping her children was
unfortunate but maintained that the father did not have a legal
remedy because it was neither criminal nor necessarily abusive for a
mother to remove her children from their father.153 The father in that
case now argues that the ‘court’s decision simply awarded custody to
the parent who took the children away first.154 This is another
example in which the particular legal culture in Japan poses a barrier
to complying with the Hague Convention; specifically, it is an
example in which Japan violates the Hague Convention’s Article 21
rights of access by failing to allow a child to maintain a relationship
with both parents.155
Since the criminal code was not applied in this case, it shows that
parental kidnapping in Japan is not consistently a criminal action.
contracting States are not required to return the child if the other person
“consented” to the child’s removal, if there is “grave risk” to the child, or if the
child is above a certain age and “rejects to being returned;” the article mandates
that “authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social
background of the child”).
152. See Jones, Divorce and Child Custody Issues in the Japanese Legal System,
supra note 87 (affirming that “both the characterization of parental abduction as a
non-crime and the arrest of some parents for criminal abduction can co-exist” in
the Japanese legal system, yet Japanese authorities rarely recognize the latter).
153. Sforza, supra note 139 (telling the story of an Italian father who is fighting
for custody of his children after his Japanese wife and her parents kidnapped the
children).
154. Id.
155. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 102, art. 21 (obliging signatories to
“promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfillment of any
conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject); E-mail from
Jeffery Morehouse, supra note 4 (reporting that “[o]f the 40 pre-convention cases
that filed an access application, only one of the BAC Home parents is reporting
having some ongoing Skype access to his kidnapped child. Three reported to
having 1-3 Skype sessions with their children before the kidnapping parent again
cut off all access without recourse. The overwhelming majority have received
nothing.”).
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Further, the court perpetuated the assumption that the mother is the
correct parent to have custody, regardless of the father’s wishes.156 It
also perpetuated a common cultural norm that a mixed child should
choose to identify with his or her Japanese identity to the exclusion
of his or her mixed identity.157 The father recognized that he would
be arguing his case from a disadvantaged legal position because the
court would expect him to conform to stricter behavioral norms in
court than might be expected from a Japanese parent.158
In a 2004 case, the Court of the Second Instance in Sendai High
Court ruled that a father’s act of kidnapping his own child was not
justified when there was “no special circumstance in which it was
actually necessary for the father to commit such an act and the act
was violent and coercive.”159 However, the dissenting Justice Takkii
opined that kidnapping should not automatically be criminalized in
such instances where the father’s act derived from parental
affection.160
Justice Takkii’s opinion suggests that Japanese legal culture
remains divided as to the criminal nature of parental kidnapping in
general. Although the court found parental kidnapping in that case,
the majority opinion narrows the rule with qualifying language that
contemplates “special circumstances” and elements that require
violence and coercion.161 Further, the fact that the dissent’s even
narrower rule was offered at all goes to the pervasiveness of this
opinion in the culture at large—that the parent’s love for the child
justifies parental kidnapping.162 Thus, the Japanese Criminal Code’s
inconsistent application violates Article 7 of the Hague Convention
156. Sforza, supra note 139 (referring to the Japanese grandmother’s comments
to the Italian father, “[w]hat’s the problem if you don’t see them for one or two
years? I raised three kids without my husband”).
157. Id. (highlighting the cultural preference for mixed children to remain in
Japan using the Japanese grandmother’s view that “[the children] are in Japan, why
should the kids speak Italian”).
158. Id. (positing that it would be useless for the Italian father to act angry in a
Japanese court because of the cultural preference for keeping children of mixedJapanese ethnicity in Japan).
159. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 6, 2005, 2004 (A) 2199, 59 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] no. 10, http://www.courts.go.jp/
app/hanrei_en/detail?id=793 (Japan).
160. Id. (Takii, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. (Takii, J., dissenting).
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requiring judicial proceedings to return the child.163
Under Article 7(f), Japan agrees “to initiate or facilitate the
institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to
obtaining the return of the child.”164 In the Italian father case, the
broader legal culture, including the police and social services, acted
with a view to obtaining a quiet resolution when it should have acted
“with a view to obtaining the return of the child.”165 Similarly, in the
Sendai case, the court sets out a rule that criminalizes parental
kidnapping only in the presence of violence and coercion.166 Such an
interpretation legitimizes the kind of parental kidnapping that
occurred in the Toland and Savoie cases—one parent quietly
traveling with the child outside of the other parent’s home
jurisdiction and without the other parent’s consent.167

C. IMPLEMENTATION ACT ARTICLES 2, 7, AND 28 ON ‘HABITUAL
RESIDENCE,’ ‘RIGHTS OF CUSTODY,’ AND ‘GRAVE RISK’ VIOLATE
THE HAGUE CONVENTION ARTICLES 1 AND 7 ON ‘RIGHTS OF
ACCESS’ AND ‘PROMPT RETURN OF CHILDREN’
Japan’s Implementation Act insufficiently defines “habitual
residence” and, as such, allows violations of the Hague
Convention.168 This section discusses how the Implementation Act’s
163. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 99, art. 7 (listing obligations to
which Contracting States agree, including creating judicial and administrative
mechanisms that will “achieve the . . . objects of this Convention”).
164. Id. at 99, art. 7(f).
165. See id.
166. 2004 (A) 2199, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] no. 10.
167. See Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2012) (leaving the United
States and traveling to Japan); Toland v. Futagi, 40 A.3d 1051, 1065-66 (Md.
2012) (leaving the United States jurisdiction of a United States military installation
in Japan).
168. See Jeremy D. Morley, Ineffective Access Rights in Japan Under Hague
Abduction Convention, THE LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY D. MORLEY – INTERNATIONAL
FAMILY LAW (June 19, 2015), http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/
2015/06/ (stating that it is not possible to make a Hague Convention access
application in Japan “if the child is habitually resident in Japan” when a violation
to the alleged right of access occurs); see also Jeremy D. Morley, Japan and The
Hague Abduction Convention: Implementation and Practical Effects, THE LAW
OFFICE OF JEREMY D. MORLEY – INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW, (June 11, 2014),
http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/2014/06/japan-and-hague-abductionconvention_11.html (noting that United States courts have exercised “factsensitiv[ity]” and “enormous diversity” when interpreting “habitual residence,” but
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weak definitions of “habitual residence” and “intolerable situation,”
as well as weak enforcement mechanisms, violate the Hague
Convention.
The Implementation Act’s weak definition of “habitual residence”
and “intolerable situation” violates the Hague Convention because it
provides too much discretion to Japanese courts that may prefer
maintaining half-Japanese children’s residence in Japan.169 In
Toland, although the father attempted to regain custody from the
moment of abduction, he was unable to prevail in Japanese court;
thus, by the time he brought the case in U.S. courts, the child had
spent her entire childhood in Japan and ordering her to relocate to the
U.S. proved untenable.170
Although Japan was not a party to the Hague Convention at the
time of the Toland case, this situation presents a difficult situation for
parents hoping to overcome the “habitual residence” and “intolerable
situation” arguments when Japanese courts have protected the
abducting parent.171 American military members are particularly
vulnerable to such interpretations because military families often live
within the local communities, even calling the duty station country
‘home’ over the U.S. Indeed, the Hague Convention itself does not
define “habitual residence.” Thus, a Japanese court’s interpretation
of “habitual residence” may prevent the abandoned parent from
retrieving the child under a Hague Convention return order.
Finally, the Implementation Act’s weak enforcement mechanisms
violate the Hague Convention because it prevents execution of return
orders. In 2015, Japan issued its first return order of a child from
Japan to the United States; however, the order was never enforced.172
lower courts in Japan have only established “some precedent” about “habitual
residence”).
169. See Implementation Act, art. 2(v) (defining “habitual residence” as a state
“where a child held his/her habitual residence at the time of his/her removal or
immediately before the commencement of his/her retention”).
170. See Toland v. Futagi, 40 A.3d at 1059-60 (Judge Salant held that the
child’s “home state” was Japan because she spent her life there).
171. See Morely, Japan and The Hague Abduction Convention: Implementation
and Practical Effects, supra note 168, (explaining that the Implementing Act
includes a provision that will not require a court to “order the return of the child” if
the party against the return can prove that the child would be at “grave risk” of an
“intolerable situation” if returned).
172. IPCA, supra note 4, at 32 (noting that authorities made an effort to enforce
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Failure to enforce a return order also effectively fails to comply with
the objectives of the Hague Convention.173
Since Japanese
enforcement officers may not forcibly remove the child from the
kidnapper’s home and must wait until the child “make[s] the first
move to reach out to the enforcement officer,”174 the Implementation
Act employs weak enforcement mechanisms that fail to execute
return orders.175
Because of these fundamental failures, Japan fails to comply with
the Hague Convention by utilizing inconsistencies in the Family
Registry Act, Civil Code, Criminal Code, and Implementation Act.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As this Comment demonstrates, Japanese legislatures and judicial
systems have shifted towards complying with the Hague Convention
by passing the Implementation Act.176 However, there are three ways
in which Japan could alter its domestic laws to fully comply with the
Hague Convention and provide proper remedies for abandoned
parents. First, Japan should amend the Family Registry System
Article 76.177 Second, Japan should amend Civil Code Articles 820,
821, and 824.178 Third, Japan should amend Implementation Act
Article 28(2).179 Finally, the international community can encourage
the order but were ultimately unable to do so, indicating that there is a “systematic
flaw” in implementation of “return orders” in Japan).
173. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at 98, art. 1 (stating that the
objectives are to ensure that “wrongfully removed” children are “prompt[ly]
returned” and that “rights of custody” remain “effectively respected”).
174. Implementation Act, art. 7(v) (prohibiting the use of force when attempting
to execute a return order); see E-mail from Andrew Ellis, supra note 120 (pointing
out that such a standard is unreasonable and “will never happen”).
175. See E-mail from Andrew Ellis, supra note 120 (caveating the fact that
Japanese courts do issue return orders with the fact that the Implementation Act’s
weakness is a lack of enforcement mechanisms to execute the orders).
176. See supra Part II.C (explaining that by establishing the Implementation
Act, Japan put the Hague Convention into effect).
177. See infra Part IV.A (stating that the amendment should provide equal rights
to parents who are not Japanese).
178. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that these amendments would offer an
improved framework to establish custody arrangements in instances where
Japanese-American couples divorce).
179. See infra Part IV.C (noting that this amendment would prevent
contradictions by reducing the amount of discretion Japanese judges have in cases
involving the Hague Convention).
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Japan to enact these changes by imposing targeted sanctions through
the Goldman Act.180

A. FAMILY REGISTER ACT ARTICLE 76
Japan’s rich cultural history has provided positive and negative
consequences in modern times. For example, Japan’s communal
culture creates an organized, cooperative, and respectful society.181
However, this same culture harms individual children and parents
who do not conform to or perform within the parameters of this
society.182 As such, Family Registry System Act No. 224 should be
amended to give equal rights to non-Japanese parents and provide for
truly shared custody of children.183 This would allow Japanese courts
to comply with the Hague Convention by ensuring both parents
maintain a relationship with the child instead of allowing a parent to
resort to kidnapping the child from the fellow parent.

B. CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 819, 820, 821, AND 824
Because Japan often permits the judiciary to interpret international
law, Japanese Civil Code Articles 820, 821, and 824 should be
amended to provide a better framework for Japanese-American
divorcing couples to determine custody. In these relatively early
stages of Hague Convention ratification in Japan, Japanese legal
systems have the power to establish a culture of compliance rather
than resistance.
180. See infra Part IV.D (explaining that the United States’ enforcement of the
Goldman Act may place sufficient pressure on Japan to act in accordance with the
Hague Convention).
181. See generally MURCH, supra note 36 (providing insight into Japan’s culture
through the lens of achieving successful business dealings with Japanese
companies).
182. See Roxana Saberi, Being ‘Hafu’ in Japan: Mixed-Race People Face
Ridicule, Rejection, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 9, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/9/hafu-in-japan-mixed-race.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2017) (quoting tweets that disparage mixed-race Japanese people).
183. Jiji Press & Kyodo News, New Bill Seeks to Promote Parent-Child
Interaction
Following
Divorce,
JAPAN
TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2017),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/06/national/new-bill-seeks-promoteparent-child-interaction-following-divorce/#.WLNPPRIrLeQ (last visited Feb. 26,
2017) (reporting that Japanese lawmakers are scheduled to propose a bill in June
2017 that requests “the state to consider introducing a joint parental custody
system”).
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The judicial system determines the role of international law in
Japan. Timothy Webster uses the application of international human
rights norms in Japan to show that judges rather than legislators
promulgate international law.184 Amending the Civil Code from “a
person who exercises parental authority” to “the persons who
exercise parental authority” will allow both parents to have legal
authority over children. This legal authority will give the abandoned
parent an equal voice with the kidnapping parent in conciliation and
litigation. The abandoned parent might overcome the court’s
tendency to legitimize the kidnapping parent’s physical control under
Civil Code Article 821.185
Japan seems to be making progress in the realm of visitation
rights. For example, a group of lawmakers are preparing to
introduce a bill that requires divorcing parents to state any visitation
agreements in writing.186 However, even if this bill succeeds, Japan
must still effectively enforce the visitation agreements to comply
with the Hague Convention’s Article 21 Rights to Access obligation.

C. IMPLEMENTATION ACT ARTICLE 28(2)
The Implementation Statute has provided a space for Japan to
circumvent the Hague Convention. Because Japanese legal culture
itself promotes biases and principles that contradict those of the
Hague Convention, Japanese legislatures should amend Article 28(1)
and 28(2) of the Implementation Act to limit the discretion Japanese
judges have when deciding a case under the Hague Convention.
Since Japanese family courts do not specialize in family law,187
parties should not have to rely on the judge’s discretion to determine
184. See Webster, supra note 100, at 242 (noting that the critical role of
“disseminating contemporary international human rights norms” has been left to
judges over time).
185. CIVIL C. art. 821 (“Residence of a child shall be determined by a person
who exercises parental authority.”).
186. Jiji Press & Kyodo News, supra note 183 (explaining that the bill would
require divorcing couples to write out “frequency of the visitations” and a method
of splitting the costs of caring for their children).
187. Konno, supra note 61, at 49 (clarifying that the “broad scope” nature of
family court prompts judges in these courts to not pursue a family law
specialization); see SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, supra note 60, at 8-13 (stating that
the court officials are experts in domestic problems without mentioning whether
judges in family court have any specific expertise in family law).
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whether a child will be at risk if returned to the state of habitual
residence. Moreover, the police force does not have authority to
enforce Japanese family law orders. Thus, judges tend to rule to
maintain the status quo to avoid the appearance of noncompliance
when a parent refuses to return the abducted child.188 Also, Article
28 (1)(iv) should provide a definition for “intolerable situation” that
prevents courts from rewarding the kidnapping parent. Further,
courts should require evidence of domestic violence claims before
denying return orders and visitation rights.189 Because Japanese
culture does not lend itself to compliance with Western society’s
notions of healthy, mixed-culture children,190 the Implementation Act
should limit the court’s discretion in issuing return orders that tend to
favor the status quo and the Japanese parent.

D. UNITED STATES SANCTIONS THROUGH THE GOLDMAN ACT AND
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
The international community has significant influence over Japan
as can be seen through the international pressure that caused Japan to
adopt the Hague Convention. Thus, international pressure may again
successfully influence Japan to comply with the Hague Convention
through implementation of the above-mentioned changes in domestic
law and policy. The Sean and David Goldman International Child
Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014 (Goldman Act) and
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) are the two statutes the United States has implemented on
international parental kidnapping that may pressure Japan to comply
with the Hague Convention. For example, the Goldman Act gives
188. Telephone Interview with Paul Toland, supra note 65 (explaining that
judges are not able to change from the status quo because they would not be able to
enforce a ruling outside of this and would lose respect).
189. Tanase, supra note 80, at 588 (commenting that allowing uninvestigated
allegations of domestic violence to be a source of visitation denial would be “too
crude” for “modern family law”); see Telephone Interview with Paul Toland,
supra note 65 (opining that a claim of domestic abuse can sometimes be used as a
“red herring” in cases involving visitation).
190. See Sforza, supra note 139 (supporting the widely-held assumption that a
mixed child’s Japanese culture is most important within their identity when a
grandparent considered it unnecessary for the children to speak Italian); Saberi,
supra note 182 (presenting examples of the pervasive racism against mixed-race
children still present in modern Japan).
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the U.S. Secretary of State the power to act in response to
noncompliant countries,191 and establishes procedures for the return
of children who are victims of parental abduction.192
Since Japan and the United States share a powerful alliance,
implementing the acts would likely cause Japan to seriously evaluate
their domestic laws and policies with respect to the Hague
Convention. For example, the Goldman Act gives the Secretary of
State the power to “withdraw, limit, or suspend” development,
security, and economic assistance.193 These acts would communicate
to Japan that an alliance with the United States must include Japan’s
compliance with its obligations under the Hague Convention.
Similar to the way Japanese society uses peer pressure to maintain
a peaceful society, the U.S. should use the same social pressure on
Japan to maintain a peaceful international society. The U.S. is the
logical leader in the international community to push Japan to
comply with the Hague Convention as the presence of American
military families in Japan evidences a strong national security aspect
to this issue for both the United States and the Pacific region.
The UCCJEA, in most states, honors foreign court orders for
custody.194 For international child abduction cases, if an American
service member and his or her spouse separate or divorce, the
custody determination at the outset will affect the legal rights the
noncustodial parent has for the future. If a Japanese court grants full
custody to the Japanese parent, the American parent has a weaker
claim, if any at all, when an international kidnapping issue arises.195
191. Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and
Return Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-150, § 202 (2014) [hereinafter Goldman Act]
(listing potential actions from public condemnation to withdrawal of security
assistance).
192. Id. (detailing the process of addressing “patterns of noncompliance”
regarding parental abduction).
193. Id. §202(d)(5-8) (stating that “development assistance,” “economic
assistance,” and assistance to a country’s central government can all be subject to
“withdrawal, limitation, or suspension”).
194. See generally Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997), prefatory note, 1-6
(noting that the UCCJEA does not allow an “enforcing court” to make any changes
to a “custody determination”).
195. See Sullivan, supra note 38 (explaining that if there are child custody
matters involving children who are citizens of the United States, a United States
citizen who is part of a divorcing couple would benefit from having courts in the
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In such a case, even U.S. law would fail to protect the abandoned
parent against the Japanese system. Thus, the abandoned American
parent needs the power of the Hague Convention to maintain a
relationship with his or her child if the Japanese parent decides to
restrict access. If the U.S. declines to apply the UCCJEA to
Japanese custody determinations it may pressure Japan to amend the
relevant family law and come into compliance with the Hague
Convention.196

V. CONCLUSION
Japan continues to be non-compliant with the Hague Convention
through a combination of the Family Register Act, Civil and
Criminal Codes, and Implementation Act. Japan should implement
the amendments outlined in Part IV in order to change the legal
culture such that Japan will come into compliance with the Hague
Convention. International pressure, specifically from the United
States, may be an effective way to push Japan to make these
amendments. In this way, American military families will be able to
exercise their rights under the Hague Convention to regain access or
return of their kidnapped children in Japan. The international
community will also no longer view Japan as a “black hole” for
international parental abduction, thereby repairing this aspect of
Japan’s reputation in the international legal community.

United States enforce the “decree”).
196. See supra Sections IV.A-C (noting that Japan may comply with the Hague
Convention by offering equal rights to parents who are not Japanese, having an
improved framework for custody proceedings among Japanese-American couples
who are divorcing, and putting parameters on the Japanese judges’ capacity to use
their own discretion when ruling on a case involving the Hague Convention).

